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Abstract 
 Although a potentially useful climate change mitigation tool, carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) efforts in the United States remain mired in demonstration and development.  
Prior studies suggest numerous reasons for this stagnation.  This article empirically assesses 
those claims.  Using an anonymous opinion survey completed by 229 CCS experts, we identified 
four primary barriers to CCS commercialization: (1) cost and cost recovery, (2) lack of a price 
signal or financial incentive, (3) long-term liability risks, and (4) lack of a comprehensive 
regulatory regime.  These results give empirical weight to previous studies suggesting that CCS 
cost (and cost recovery) and liability risks are primary barriers to the technology.  However, the 
need for comprehensive rather than piecemeal CCS regulation represents an emerging concern 
not previously singled out in the literature.  Our results clearly show that the CCS community 
sees fragmented regulation as one of the most significant barriers to CCS deployment.  
Specifically, industry is united in its preference for a federal regulatory floor that is subject to 
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state-level administration and sensitive to local conditions.  Likewise, CCS experts share broad 
confidence in the technology’s readiness, despite continued calls for commercial-scale 
demonstration projects before CCS is widely deployed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 Coal consumption rests at the intersection of energy policy’s threefold objectives: 
providing (1) ample, secure supplies that are (2) low cost and (3) environmentally sustainable 
(Lyster and Bradbrook, 2006).  Coal is abundantly used in the United States, providing nearly 
half of the nation’s electricity production (EIA, 2012), but it is also linked to climate change.  
Worldwide anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions currently total more than 33 billion 
tons annually (PBL, 2011), a level now recognized as unsustainable (IPCC, 2007).  Concerns 
over climate change and national energy security have prompted a reexamination of fossil fuel 
use, including coal. 
Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is one possible strategy for tapping the energy 
security benefits of coal while simultaneously mitigating climate change emissions.  CCS is the 
process of capturing CO2 and injecting that CO2 deep underground for permanent storage and 
sequestration.
1
  CCS can be used with other fossil fuel combustion processes, such as natural gas, 
but it is most closely linked with coal-fired electricity generation. 
 Despite extensive governmental backing, CCS development has proceeded in halting 
starts and stops in the United States.  According to the Global CCS Institute, as of September 
2012, the United States had twenty-four large-scale CCS projects in the planning or operational 
stages.  Only four of these projects, however, were operational, and these were connected to 
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enhanced oil recovery efforts.  Moreover, these twenty-four projects represent a decreasing effort 
in large-scale CCS efforts, down from thirty-one large-scale CCS projects underway in 2010 
(Global CCS Institute, 2012). 
Prior studies have suggested numerous reasons for this stagnation, but these explanations 
have been subjected to limited empirical testing.  This article seeks to advance the discussion by 
presenting empirical data on both CCS impediments and potential policy responses to CCS 
commercialization barriers.  To do so, we conducted an anonymous opinion survey of 229 
stakeholders in CCS technology development, CO2 emitting industries, CCS regulation, and 
other areas of CCS expertise.  The survey had five goals: (1) to identify perceived barriers to 
commercial-scale CCS deployment, (2) to rate the significance of those barriers, (3) to compare 
the severity of perceived barriers across sectors, (4) to identify discrepancies between perceived 
barriers and CCS policies, and (5) to provide a basis for future CCS policy recommendations. 
 The survey data provide new insight into how CCS policy might be shaped.  They also 
confirm prior studies’ emphasis on cost and liability concerns as primary barriers to CCS 
implementation.  Thus, to help CCS reach widespread commercial use, a carbon price or other 
significant financial incentive is needed, and the liability risks of long-term CO2 storage must be 
addressed.  Moreover, the CCS community craves a predictable, comprehensive regulatory 
regime—something overlooked by the extant scholarly literature, which has tended to focus on 
discrete legal and regulatory issues.  The survey data suggest that this regime should employ a 
dynamic, or cooperative, federalist model of regulation—that is, one where national regulators 
set minimum legal requirements but state officials craft the specific implementation measures for 
those rules to account for local conditions.  This regime would likely include eventual federal 
ownership of stored CO2 and control over interstate CO2 transport, pipelines, and all aspects of 
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offshore CCS, but would not disturb traditional areas of state control (e.g., property rights, pore 
space ownership, mineral rights unitization, and eminent domain).  It also would not place first 
priority on commercial-scale demonstration projects, and would instead emphasize tax credits 
and incentives over other options, such as technological mandates, subsidies, and funding for 
research and development. 
2.  Possible Barriers to CCS Commercialization 
Although prior CCS studies are numerous, the scholarly literature has not yet 
systematically assessed the barriers to commercial-scale CCS deployment in the United States. 
Instead, scholarly empirical studies have focused primarily on Europe (Anderson et al., 2007; 
Evar, 2011; Fischebick et al., 2009; Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009; ICF, 2007; Johnsson et al., 
2010; Ramírez et al., 2008; Sala and Oltra, 2011; Stigson et al., 2012; van Alpen et al., 2007; 
Wallquist et al., 2010).  Within the United States, CCS studies tend to focus on qualitatively 
outlining impediments that CCS commercialization faces, without any empirical evaluation.  
Other authors have highlighted government incentives, concentrating on options for promoting 
CCS (DeCesar, 2010; Flatt, 2009; Som 2008).  Still others have zeroed in on public perception of 
CCS and climate change (Bradbury et al., 2009; Curry, 2004).  While often recognizing that 
regulatory uncertainty acts as an impediment to CCS commercialization, most of the law and 
policy literature has emphasized specific legal issues, such as potential CCS liability mitigation 
regimes, pore space ownership, or CO2 pipeline regulation. 
Potential barriers to CCS commercialization identified in prior studies include cost, the 
need for commercial-scale demonstration projects, liability and property rights issues associated 
with long-term CCS storage, safety and siting concerns, and the need for greater geologic 
knowledge and predictive modeling capabilities (Carnegie Mellon, 2009; Folger, 2009; GAO, 
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2008; IEA, 2007; IEA, 2010; IPCC, 2005a; IRGC, 2008; Melzer, 2008; NETL, 2006; Parker et 
al., 2009; Pew Center, 2008; University of Houston, 2008; WRI, 2007; WRI, 2008).  Scholars 
have also noted the general public’s limited knowledge about CCS and the technologies involved 
(Bradbury et al., 2009; Curry, 2004), while others have suggested that public outreach is 
necessary to build trust between communities and project developers, and to counteract what has 
been characterized as a “pessimistic” public attitude about CCS (Carnegie Mellon, 2009; DOE, 
2010; WRI, 2008). 
Of these various barriers, the higher cost of CCS-based electricity production, associated 
largely with the energy penalty from the CO2 capture phase of CCS, has received the greatest 
attention (Der, 2010; GAO, 2008; Melzer, 2008; Pew Center, 2008).  Estimates place the cost of 
retrofitting an existing power plant with CCS technology, as reflected by the increased cost of 
electricity, at 50-80% above existing costs (Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies Hearing, 
2008; FutureGen Program Hearing, 2008).  The absence of any financial incentive for CCS, such 
as a carbon price, is thus viewed as a fundamental barrier to CCS deployment (DOE, 2010; GAO, 
2008; Pew Center, 2008).  This relationship may create a Catch-22 of sorts.  As Folger observes, 
“To achieve commercialization, [CCS] must . . . meet a market demand—a demand created 
either through a price mechanism or a regulatory requirement (demand-pull mechanisms)” 
(Folger, 2009).  The failure of the United States to create a market reflecting the true price of 
carbon therefore serves as a disincentive for CCS deployment (Der, 2010; Pew Center, 2008), 
leading some commentators to suggest that CCS is unlikely to be economically favorable in the 
United States for at least two decades (JP Morgan, 2007).  Focusing on price, the literature also 
advocates for research and development to increase CCS cost-effectiveness (GAO, 2008), along 
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with addressing the capital costs that the extensive pipeline infrastructure that broadscale CCS 
would entail (DOE, 2010; WRI, 2008). 
After cost, liability receives the greatest attention as an impediment to CCS deployment 
(Attanasio, 2009; Bidlack, 2010; DOE, 2010; Hoffman, 2010; Klass and Wilson, 2008; Som, 
2008).  Liability for CO2 storage is unclear.  Two groups potentially bear the primary long-term 
legal risks for post-injection CO2 management: private companies that take on CCS projects and 
the government/taxpayers.  Which group ultimately will bear the risk is an open question 
(Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies Hearing, 2008).  Accordingly, numerous observers 
have highlighted the uncertainty surrounding potential liability for carbon storage as a key source 
of industry reluctance for CCS investment (Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies Hearing, 
2008; Carnegie Mellon, 2009; Chestney, 2009; DOE, 2010).  To address this barrier, observers 
have proposed a number of possible liability strategies, including traditional bonding and 
insurance, statutory liability limits, imposing responsibility on states, mandating federal 
ownership for stored CO2, and various hybrid private-public solutions (Carnegie Mellon, 2009; 
DOE, 2010; Flatt, 2009; WRI, 2008). 
Policy studies have also observed CCS’s need for continuous monitoring, especially via 
risk assessment and mitigation measures following CO2 injection (DOE, 2011; NETL, 2009).  
While monitoring strategies must be site-specific to account for local surface and subsurface 
variations, these studies suggest that a comprehensive regulatory framework for monitoring, 
mitigation, verification, and accounting will be essential for wide-scale CCS deployment (DOE, 
2011; NETL, 2009).  This is in part because of CCS’s potential for groundwater contamination 
and displacement (Folger, 2009; IRGC, 2008), but also because CCS presents many unanswered 
property law questions (Anderson, 2009; DeCesar, 2010; Fish and Wood, 2008; Flatt, 2009; 
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Kennett et al., 2006; Klass and Wilson, 2010; Sprankling, 2008; University of Houston, 2008).  
Many of these questions are matters of state rather than federal law, and as such, could be 
resolved in multiple and potentially conflicting ways. 
Discussions of general CCS regulation follow a similar refrain.  Throughout the CCS 
literature, “[r]egulatory uncertainty is widely identified as a key barrier to CCS deployment in 
the United States” (DOE, 2010).  However, while some studies have questioned whether a 
comprehensive CCS framework is needed (University of Houston, 2008), most focus on how 
existing statutory regimes will apply to CCS (DOE, 2010; GAO, 2008; Marston and Moore, 
2008).  The chief concern from a CCS deployment perspective is the need “to ensure that [the] 
effective operation [of these laws] does not hamper CCS for no additional benefit” (University of 
Houston, 2008; Moore, 2007).  This is because numerous existing statutes already are, or may 
soon, impact CCS development.  In addition to emerging state regulatory regimes (Reitze and 
Durrant, 2011), these include the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species 
Act, and Department of Transportation pipeline regulation (DOE, 2010; Horne, 2010; Marston 
and Moore, 2008; Reitze, 2011). 
A final impediment to broadscale CCS deployment cited widely in the literature is the 
lack of sufficient commercial-scale demonstration projects (GAO, 2008).  Although CO2 is 
currently utilized in several industrial applications, technological advancements will be required 
before existing CCS technologies are widely deployed (Der, 2010; DOE, 2010).  These include 
scale-up challenges for capture technologies at power plants, the need for a nearly pure CO2 
stream for CCS transport and storage, and the ability to verify the permanence of CO2 storage 
underground (DOE, 2010; GAO, 2008).  Accordingly, many studies question the appropriate 
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level of federal investment in CCS R&D (Der, 2010; Parker et al., 2009), with some noting that 
current DOE spending on CCS is far below past government efforts at major technological 
innovation such as the Manhattan Project and the Apollo program (Parker et al., 2009).  In 
addition to carbon pricing, the literature suggests four primary approaches for funding CCS: 
(1) government loan or grant programs; (2) direct government financial incentives, such as tax 
credits; (3) private industry funding; and (4) international collaboration (Carbon Capture and 
Storage Technologies Hearing, 2008; Der, 2010; IRGC, 2008). 
3.  Survey Methodology 
Consistent with prior studies seeking to ascertain how policy might best promote 
emergent technologies (Bowen, 2012; Bürer and Wüstenhagen, 2009; Hansson and Bryngelsson, 
2009; Johnsson, 2010; Evar, 2011; Sala and Oltra, 2011; Stigson et al., 2012), our survey 
targeted experts in CCS technology, policy, and implementation.  Our study focused on CCS 
deployment and policy in the United States, so unlike some earlier surveys, only companies and 
organizations with a domestic presence were included.  Potential survey recipients were 
identified based on participation in established CCS industry and research and development 
programs, including U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) regional carbon sequestration 
partnerships, attendance at CCS conferences and seminars, and participation in other CCS 
projects. 
Survey questions were developed based on issues identified through a review of CCS 
literature and policy.  Surveys were pretested on University of Utah faculty and staff during the 
fall of 2011; the survey was administered during early 2012.  Each recipient received a unique, 
password-protected internet link to access and complete the survey.  All responses were 




Survey participation was robust.  In total, 229 out of 501 survey recipients responded to 
the survey (45.7%).  Of those, 195 recipients, or 85.2%, completed the survey in its entirety.  
Survey respondents fell into six possible affiliations: CCS operators, CCS researchers, CO2 
emitters, CCS consultants (including legal, financial, and engineering), government agency 
employees or regulators, and interest group representatives. 
 Consistent with standard survey methodology (Hauser and Rao, 2002; Wind et al., 1979), 
the survey included both open-ended questions and numerical ranking questions.  To avoid 
suggestion bias, open-ended questions preceded ranking questions (Hauser and Rao, 2002; Wind 
et al., 1979).  Participants also provided generic affiliation data, including their role in CCS.  
These categories of questions are referred to as the survey’s “open-ended,” “ranking,” and 
“demographic” questions respectively.  Figure 1 details survey respondents demographically. 
 
Figure 1: Number of Respondents by Affiliation
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 The ranking and open-ended questions cut across three primary areas of inquiry: potential 
barriers to CCS commercialization, possible government efforts to promote CCS, and potential 
CCS policy.  In the ranking questions, respondents ranked forty-one possible barriers to CCS 
commercialization on a one-to-five scale.  Possible barriers to CCS commercialization were 
identified based on a literature and policy review.  See supra Section 2.  These forty-one 
potential barriers fell into seven broad categories: CCS cost, liability, facility siting, technology 
insufficiency, lack of a CCS price signal, lack of a CCS regulatory regime, and public resistance 
to CCS.
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  For each broad category, the survey included one catchall question and then more 
specific questions about discrete elements of the barrier class.  Respondents also ranked their 
level of agreement with seventeen different statements about CCS regulation.  A chart showing 
responses to all questions, including mean scores and standard deviations, is available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.033.   In the figures that follow, shading represents the 
range of responses that fall within one standard deviation of the mean response value.  Values 
shown in bold and italics were statistically significant at the .05 level when measured against 
overall mean scores. 
  Textual responses to the open-ended questions were analyzed and placed into categories 
corresponding to the ranking questions.  To avoid coding bias, two researchers coded the open-
ended responses independently and compared results only after coding was complete.  Where 
coding differences occurred, they were reconciled through collaborative review of the textual 
answers. 
4.  Results 
 The survey results provide three key contributions to understanding CCS 
commercialization in the United States.  First, the survey data offer empirical confirmation of 
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what, previously, have been generally anecdotal and qualitative suggestions about the barriers 
faced by broadscale CCS in the United States.  The survey results show that there are four 
primary, interrelated barriers to CCS commercialization: cost and cost recovery, lack of a price 
signal or financial incentive for CCS use, liability, and lack of comprehensive CCS regulation.  
CCS cost, no price signal for CCS use (e.g., lack of climate change legislation), and liability 
risks all have repeatedly been pointed to as impediments to CCS commercialization.  Our data 
empirically confirm this traditional logic.  Indeed, cost and cost-recovery are perceived by the 
CCS community to be the greatest obstacles to CCS deployment. 
 Second, the survey findings call into question several conventional assumptions that have 
been made about CCS.  For instance, survey respondents identified the lack of a comprehensive 
CCS regulatory regime as a primary obstacle to CCS deployment.  However, this is not a barrier 
to CCS use that previously has received substantial scholarly attention.  Likewise, many prior 
studies have suggested that a key impediment to CCS deployment is the lack of commercial-
scale demonstration projects (GAO, 2008).  By contrast, several survey respondents expressed 
relative confidence in CCS technology compared to other CCS barriers.  Indeed, respondents’ 
experience with, and confidence in, CCS technology were positively correlated. 
 Finally, the survey results provide significant new detail on the type of policy and 
regulatory regime that the CCS community desires.  Market incentives are favored over statutory 
mandates.  These preferred incentives include tax/financial incentives, liability limits, a 
comprehensive CCS regulatory framework, and a carbon tax.  Similarly, the CCS community 
wants clear, comprehensive regulation, including liability limits and a cooperative federalist 
approach to regulation.  The preferred form of liability protection includes the government taking 
long-term responsibility for sequestered CO2. 
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These findings fall into the three broad classes of questions answered by survey 
respondents: barriers to CCS commercialization, preferences on financial incentives, and 
regulatory substance and structure. 
4.1.  Barriers to CCS Commercialization 
 The survey results identified four primary, interrelated barriers to commercial-scale CCS 
deployment: (1) the high marginal cost of incorporating CCS into electricity production and the 
inability to recover CCS costs, (2) the lack of a price signal to incentivize CCS use, (3) long-term 
liability for sequestered CO2, and (4) the lack of comprehensive CCS regulation. 
 By contrast, a number of possible barriers previously identified in the literature received 
lower mean scores than expected.  See Figure 2.  While the CCS community considers the lack 
of demonstration projects an impediment to technology deployment, they perceive it to be less 
significant than many prior studies suggest.  Likewise, although concern over public resistance to 
CCS projects has been cited as an obstacle to CCS deployment (Stigson et al., 2012; WRI, 2008), 
the CCS community scored this low on the scale of possible barriers.  Lack of concern over 
public resistance may reflect the public’s limited knowledge of CCS or the technologies involved 
(Curry, 2004).  Alternatively, limited concern could reflect a belief that the risk associated with 
climate change outweighs any negative consequences associated with CCS (Anderson, 2007; 
Hansson and Bryngelsson, 2009), suggesting that opposition to CCS as a mitigation strategy is 
unlikely to develop. 
 Possible CCS barriers were ranked using the mean scores for each question.  In all, five 
categories received mean scores indicating that they are perceived to be significant (mean scores 
greater than 3.50)
4
 barriers to CCS deployment: CCS cost, uncertainty regarding climate change 
legislation (i.e., the lack of a carbon price signal), CCS liability, the lack of a comprehensive 
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CCS regulatory scheme, and public resistance to CCS.  As shown in Figure 2, with the exception 
of cost, respondents overwhelmingly see the largest barriers to CCS deployment as exogenous to 
CCS.  That is, the difficulty with CCS is not CCS technology’s feasibility but the “legal, policy, 
and economic considerations,” as one survey respondent put it, that surround CCS. 
 
 The barriers that survey participants considered most substantial relate primarily to cost.  
Respondents repeatedly noted the cost of CCS, the lack of a carbon price signal or other 
incentives for using CCS, uncertainty regarding the ability to recover technology costs, and the 
risk of open-ended liability as the most formidable impediments to CCS deployment.  One 
respondent said, “CCS costs money.  [P]ut a cost on carbon emissions and then industry will 
figure it out.  [It is] really that simple.”  This concern over costs comports with the results of 
earlier surveys identifying cost as the primary barrier to CCS deployment (Johnsson et al., 2010; 
Stigson et al., 2012). 
 Survey respondents also clearly crave regulatory certainty.  The lack of “comprehensive” 
CCS regulation received a mean score almost identical to that for potential liability.  This is 
understandable given the myriad permitting, siting, property rights, liability, rate regulation, cost 
Figure 2: Mean Ranking Scores of Possible Barriers to CCS
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recovery, safety, and other legal issues that CCS presents.  Thus, in response to the question 
“What is the most significant legal or policy barrier to commercial-scale GCS deployment?,” one 
survey respondent answered:  “Lack of the legal infrastructure necessary to support sound 
development of GCS, meaning long term responsibility management, [and] state and federal 
regulations . . . that address GCS implementation issues.” 
 Figure 2’s ranking of barriers to CCS commercialization was confirmed in two ways.  
First, the open-ended responses closely match the ranking responses.  We compared the mean 
obstacle ranking scores for barrier “catchall” questions—those questions that asked about 
general categories of barriers, such as CCS cost or lack of a regulatory regime—against the 
percent of open-ended responses referencing one of the seven broad areas addressed in the 
catchall questions.
5
  When asked to identify “the most significant” obstacle to commercial-scale 
CCS deployment, respondents’ answers matched almost perfectly the order of the results to the 
ranking questions.  In open-ended questions, the most cited obstacle to CCS commercialization 
was cost, followed by lack of a carbon price signal, CCS liability, and lack of comprehensive 
CCS regulation.  See Figure 3.  This was the same order of importance that survey respondents 
placed on these barriers in the ranking questions.  The list produced from this open-ended 
question did, however, differ slightly in its ranking of the final three obstacle categories.  As 
shown in Figure 3, respondents named public resistance to CCS least often in response to this 
open-ended question, whereas it was the fifth-highest ranked obstacle in the ranking questions. 
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 Second, we compared the mean ranking scores of the broad catchall questions against the 
mean ranking scores for each of the subcategories in that category.  For instance, while 
respondents ranked the catchall “cost of CCS” as an obstacle, they also ranked more specific but 
related obstacles, such as the “cost of CO2 capture,” the “cost of CO2 storage,” and the “cost of 
CO2 transportation.”  The mean of these cost elements was compared to the mean of the catchall 
question, cost of CCS.  Similarly granular subcategory questions were surveyed for each of the 
different broad obstacle categories. 
 This cross-check revealed an order of barriers similar to that of the catchall ranking 
questions.  Although using the category-wide ranking scores dropped one obstacle, cost, from the 
first to the third most important CCS barrier, and raised another obstacle, the lack of 
comprehensive CCS regulation, from fourth to second, the overall pattern was nearly the same.  
Using the category-wide mean scores, the top four obstacles are the same as they were using 
either the catchall ranking scores or the open-ended answer percentages.  The bottom three 
obstacles also remain the same.  See Figure 4.
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 Notably, perceived obstacle importance varied little by the type of survey respondent.  As 
shown in Figure 5, respondents from all demographic classifications placed the lack of a carbon 
price or other CCS financial incentive first when the category-wide scoring metric was used.  
Likewise, all respondent categories put CCS liability fourth as an obstacle and public resistance 
fifth.  The only differences were that some respondent classes switched CCS cost and lack of 
CCS regulation between second and third, and regulators and researchers flipped the order of 
lack of CCS technology and insufficient CO2 storage site information between sixth and seventh. 
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 Our results show that those who deal with CCS technology or policy on a daily basis rank 
barriers to commercialization differently than those who self-report as dealing with these issues 
only “occasionally.”  As shown in Figure 6, those who deal with CCS more often tend to view 
the lack of CCS regulation as more problematic than those who deal with CCS less often.
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Figure 5: Obstacle Ranking by Respondent Category
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 The survey results revealed five additional findings of note concerning impediments to 
CCS.  First, with respect to cost, it is primarily the price of CO2 capture that the CCS community 
sees as an impediment to commercialization, rather than CO2 transport or storage.  This is largely 
consistent with the literature, which repeatedly has noted the energy penalty associated with CO2 
capture as a key driver for the relatively high cost of CCS (Der, 2010).  In our survey, the cost of 
CO2 capture received a higher mean score in the ranking questions (4.12) than any other factor 
except “the cost of GCS” itself.  See Figure 7.  Likewise, the “cost of retrofitting existing CO2 
emission sources” received the third highest mean score among six cost barriers (3.99).  Open-
Figure 6: Mean Obstacle Ranking by Frequency of Involvement with CCS
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ended question responses reflected a similar pattern, with the cost of capture (22%) coming in 
second only to the cost of CCS generally (61%). 
 
 Second, also related to cost, survey respondents were more concerned about the 
uncertainty of CCS cost recovery than other CCS cost risks.  Except for the cost of CO2 capture, 
the options “public resistance to higher commodity and electricity prices,” “uncertainty regarding 
utilities’ ability to recover costs,” and “public utility commission reluctance to pass along GCS 
costs to ratepayers”8 received higher obstacle rankings than any other CCS cost element, 
including storage and transport.  See Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Mean CCS Cost Risks Obstacle Rankings
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 Third, with respect to liability, long-term liability of stored CO2 is considered much more 
problematic than liability for CCS transport.  The mean score for “liability for CO2 pipeline 
operators” was 2.82.  No other liability-related subcategory received a mean obstacle score lower 
than 3.43, and those for CO2 storage liability and the lack of a statutory liability cap had means 
of 4.02 and 3.85, respectively.  See Figure 9.  This is consistent with responses to the open-ended 
questions.  Of the 128 respondents identifying liability as a CCS legal or regulatory obstacle, 
66% named some kind of liability related to CO2 storage, 18% identified the lack of a regulatory 
regime alleviating liability concerns, and less than 1% of these responses pointed to liability 








Uncertainty about injected CO
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 ownership
Lack of insurance or bonding for sequestered CO
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 Fourth, the survey data suggest that there is a possible disconnect between the feasibility 
of CCS technology and the risk that industry perceives in deploying it.  That is, those familiar 
with CCS appear confident that CCS technology will work at a commercial scale, but parties are 
reluctant to be the first to assume the business risk of deploying it.  The barrier “lack of proven 
commercial-scale GCS operations” ranked comparatively high as a CCS obstacle, receiving a 
mean catchall score of 3.46.  See Figure 4.  Yet barely six percent of responses to open-ended 
questions identified CCS technology inadequacy as the most significant “financial or business-
related” obstacle to CCS use.  See Figure 11.  More importantly, of those responses, only 35% 
identified actual CCS technologies as inadequate—rather than merely pointing to a general lack 
of proof of successful commercial operations.  Similarly, the barrier “inadequate GCS 
technology” received a notably below-the-mean score of 2.84.  See Figure 4.  This dichotomy is 
telling.  It suggests a general industry confidence in the readiness of CCS technology but 
Figure 10: % of Open-Ended Responses Discussing CCS Liabilty T ype
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hesitancy to deploy it on a commercial level.  That reading of the data would be consistent with 
survey results underscoring CCS’s cost as a primary barrier to commercialization, and 
inconsistent with continued calls for the need for commercial-scale demonstration projects 




 Finally, survey respondents appear confident that both storage capacity and geological 
information about potential sequestration sites is either available or obtainable.  None of the 
possible obstacles listed under this category scored higher than 2.82, and all of them bunched 
between 2.66 and 2.82.  See Figure 4.  Lower concern over storage capacity was consistent with 
open-ended question responses, where just 3.8% of responses identified storage capacity as the 
“most significant” or “most significant legal or policy” barrier.  See Figure 3. 
4.2.  Incentives for CCS Deployment 
 The survey data were more mixed on respondents’ preferences for CCS incentives.  The 
ranking data and answers to open-ended questions generated competing lists of the most 
preferred incentives.  Likewise, analysis of the data makes clear that different sectors of the CCS 
community have different views on which incentives are best.  In short, the survey results 
indicate that the CCS community desires strong government incentives for the technology—
Figure 11: % of Open-Ended Responses Discussing CCS T echnology Adequacy
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some mix of tax/financial incentives, liability limits, a CCS regulatory framework, and a carbon 
tax—but there is no consensus on a single, “best” incentive for CCS deployment. 
 In the ranking question, respondents overwhelmingly favored policy incentives that 
address CCS costs.  Respondents ranked eleven options for promoting CCS from “most 
promising” (1) to “least promising” (11).  The most favored policy incentive was “tax incentives 
or credits,” earning a mean score of 4.34.  Close behind was imposing a carbon tax, with a mean 
score of 4.45.  Following these options were cost recovery guarantees (mean score 4.51) and  
financial liability limits (mean score 4.60).  The least popular option was mandating specific 
technology (mean score 6.27).  Notably, cap and trade (mean score 5.18) was less popular than 
imposing a carbon tax.  Aside from the value of “other” undefined incentives, imposition of a 
carbon tax and a CO2 cap and trade program were the most controversial policy options, 
reflecting the highest degree of variation from the mean response.  This may reflect the 
disproportionate media attention these policy options have received, though our survey provides 
limited basis for attributing causation.  See Figure 12.  
 Figure 12: Mean Ranking Scores of Preferred Policy Incentives 
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However, the order of preferred CCS incentives changed when measured by responses to 
the open-ended questions, as shown in Figure 13.  Using these responses, the need for CCS 
regulation dominated.  Moreover, research and development funding moved up from sixth to 
third, as did the preference for technology mandates (from last to sixth).  Suggestions of public 
education also emerged, and the weight placed on utility cost recovery measures plummeted 
(from third to last).
 
Moreover, respondents’ preferred means of incentivizing CCS deployment varied by 
affiliation, as shown in Figure 14.  CO2 emitters and consultants prefer liability limits, while 
CCS facility operators prefer tax incentives or credits.  Regulators prefer emission performance 
standards; researchers have a preference for a carbon tax; and non-profit interest groups prefer 
some other undefined option.
10
  Interest in another, undefined option is notable because this was 
the least popular option overall in the ranking question and the last choice for CO2 emitters, CCS 
facility operators, consultants, and researchers.  Indeed, no policy option had a majority of 
Figure 13: % of Combined Open-Ended Responses Identifying Preferred CCS Incentive
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respondents rank it as either the most, or as the least, promising.
   
4.3.  CCS Policy Design 
 The survey responses also offer several lessons about what CCS regulation should entail.  
The first is related to the primary barriers to commercial-scale CCS deployment:  The CCS 
community sees clarifying the regulatory landscape as one of the best ways to promote CCS use.  
Beyond this, respondents are most concerned about liability.  Respondents also favor cooperative 
Figure 14: Mean Ranking Scores of Preferred 
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federalism—that is, where the federal government sets regulatory limits that states flexibly 
implement—over other regulatory options. 
 The survey asked respondents to rate their agreement with several statements about the 
adequacy of existing CCS regulation on a standard 1-to-5 scale.  Tellingly, no area of existing 
regulation received a mean rating lower than 2.5, or “agree.”  Instead, most areas earned neutral 
(2.50 to 3.49) mean rankings.  As shown in Figure 15, those include transportation safety 
regulation, transportation ratemaking, transportation infrastructure siting, shipper access to CO2 
pipelines, CO2 storage site monitoring, storage siting, and capture retrofitting.  It is notable that 
respondents reported higher levels of confidence in existing transport regulations.  One 
explanation of this may be the oil and gas industry’s history of dealing with CO2 pipelines and 
injection as part of enhanced oil recovery operations.   
 
Figure 15: Mean Confidence Ranking in Existing CCS Regulatory Structures 
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 By contrast, respondents expressed comparatively strong disagreement with the statement 
“Existing legal structures are adequate to address commercial-scale GCS regulations.”  This 
received the second highest level of disagreement among all the policy statements, with a mean 
score of 3.71.  Only liability regulation ranked higher.  This comparative displeasure with overall 
CCS regulation suggests a general need for a more comprehensive, certain, and transparent 
regulatory structure.  Indeed, the need to develop a CCS regulatory regime accounted for more 
responses to open-ended questions than any other possible incentive.  Regulation was mentioned 
in more than 30% of the responses to the query regarding the “most important” step that 
government can take to promote CCS.  Statements such as “the lack of full spectrum legal and 
regulatory infrastructure that enables GCS” and “[i]t seems that regulations have not been set” 
were common responses to this question.  When broken down by the type of regulation 
mentioned, over 16% of open-ended responses identified crafting comprehensive CCS regulation 
as one of the best ways to incentivize CCS use.  The only more common answer involved 
limiting liability, which garnered 39% of responses.  See Figure 16. 
 28 
 
 Liability clearly was first on respondents’ minds, whether looked at from the ranking or 
open-ended question data.  As one respondent stated, “[T]he government needs to develop a way 
to take the long-term liability.  No company is going to invest in an activity with liability in 
perpetuity.  It’s simply not a risk worth taking.”  However, the data were less clear with respect 
to the preferred type of liability reform.  As Figure 17 shows, more than a fifth of responses 
called for federal custody provisions.  If combined with calls for a liability-limiting law like the 
Price-Anderson Act (which was enacted to limit liability arising from major accidents for non-
military nuclear power plant operators in an effort to incent private nuclear power production), 
long-term ownership of sequestered CO2 and limits on liability for its release account for nearly 
a third of all responses.  After that, clarification of pore space ownership ranked highest, 
followed by much smaller percentages of respondents asking for limits on environmental 
statutory and site monitoring liability. 
Figure 16: % of Open-Ended Responses Identifying CCS Regulation Area
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 With respect to how CCS regulation should be implemented, two points emerge from the 
survey data.  First, respondents favor cooperative federalism over an entirely federal or state-led 
approach.  Ranking questions asked participants to score their agreement with using either 
federal or state primacy, or a cooperative federalist approach, to regulate CCS.  Cooperative 
federalism earned a mean rating of 2.35; ensuring consistency through federal regulation 
followed closely behind at 2.39; and state regulatory primacy came in at a solidly neutral 3.00.  
See Figure 18.  These rankings were consistent with responses to the open-ended questions.  See 
Figure 19.
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Figure 18: Mean Ranking Scores for Who Should Regulate
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 Second, respondents prefer that regulatory primacy remain with the governmental entity 
already regulating the area.  That is, although respondents favor cooperative federalism generally, 
they expressed a preference for maintaining areas of traditionally federal and state regulation.  
Traditional state and local issues such as permitting, rate recovery, and property rights (including 
pore space ownership), land use, and unitization received the majority of responses preferring 
state regulation.  By contrast, areas of interstate and traditionally federal concern, such as off-
shore CO2 storage, pipeline rates and rules, and interstate transport, all received a much higher 
proportion of responses favoring federal regulation.  See Figure 20.  There were, however, two 
notable exceptions: (1) liability, and (2) safety/operation and maintenance of sites.  Although 
both of these might be characterized as primarily local in nature, liability received a full 80% of 
responses identifying it as preferred for federal regulation, and site safety and operation and 
maintenance recorded 41.7% of responses in favor of federal control.  These responses are 








perhaps not too surprising given that safety and liability are closely related, and that a large-scale 
sequestration site failure could have far-reaching consequences. 
 
5.  Implications—Shaping CCS Policy 
 If governments are going to address climate change, and if coal is to remain a dominant 
part of the global energy supply, CCS is a tool of potentially significant importance.  CCS, 
however, like all emergent technologies, raises numerous critical policy questions, from how to 
support the technology to how to address the liability risks it poses.  Policy success typically can 
be charted on the twin axes of efficacy and efficiency.  On both scores, a greater understanding 
Figure 20: % of Open-Ended Responses Identifying 
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of the pertinent issues can improve policy performance.  For emergent technologies like CCS, 
stakeholder views have much to add to this conversation.  Prior scholarship has made a number 
of suggestions for what CCS policy might look like, but with little quantitative basis reinforcing 
these views. 
 The data collected in our survey offer empirical insight into what the CCS community 
believes appropriate regulation of this climate change mitigation technology should include.  Of 
course, what the CCS community believes would be ideal regulation is not necessarily 
synonymous with optimal policymaking.  At the same time, however, when assessing the 
obstacles to, and governmental incentives needed by, emergent technologies such as CCS, the 
views of those most familiar with the technology must carry some weight.  Compared against 
prior scholarship, the data provided by our survey thus suggests an initial blueprint for how the 
United States government might facilitate the transition to greater CCS use. 
Our survey results confirm prior studies’ suggestion that cost is one of the largest barriers 
to CCS commercialization.  Thus, setting a carbon price or providing some other financial 
incentive for CCS use is an essential first step to CCS commercialization.  These mechanisms 
must allow for the recovery of costs associated with CCS deployment.  The absence of a price 
signal and investor reluctance to assume costs that are not mandated by government action led 
the list of concerns voiced by survey respondents.  Without a sufficiently high carbon price or 
some other comparably strong inducement, CCS is unlikely to reach widespread 
commercialization.  While this conclusion may be unremarkable to those familiar with climate 
change mitigation possibilities in the electricity sector, its importance is unmistakable. 
 Likewise, potential liability for CCS use must be addressed.  Earlier literature and our 
survey results align neatly in their shared emphasis on CCS liability concerns.  Both identify 
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potential CCS liability as a major impediment to CCS deployment.  This is particularly true for 
long-term liability of stored CO2, as opposed to shorter-term accidents or CO2 leaks. 
In addition, the CCS community wants comprehensive regulation for CCS 
implementation—not rules eked out one at a time, statute-by-statute, or state-by-state.  Given 
industry’s general desire for certainty (Boute, 2011; Fouquet, 2012; Rickerson, 2007), this desire 
for a comprehensive regulatory regime makes sense, but it has not been a consistent focal point 
of prior literature.  Indeed, many prior studies focusing on the United States tend either to 
assume that the existing regulatory framework will suffice until CCS scales-up to widespread 
deployment (DOE, 2010), or to focus on narrow legal questions rather than treating CCS 
holistically (Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies Hearing, 2008; Chestney, 2009; DOE, 
2010; Flatt, 2009; Freudenthal, 2008).  This is thus one of the most important messages of the 
survey results:  The CCS community craves regulatory certainty, and certainty requires 
comprehensive, integrated legislation. 
Our survey data reveal not only that the CCS industry wants a comprehensive, 
predictable regulatory regime, but also what that regime might look like.  Ideally, according to 
the survey responses, CCS regulation will rely heavily on cooperative federalism: with the 
federal government setting applicable standards and states implementing them in ways that 
reflect local conditions.  Nearly 47% of survey respondents indicated a preference for 
cooperative federalism in CCS regulation.  When considered along with the additional 33% of 
respondents who favor federal regulatory control, it should be clear that the CCS community 
supports a strong federal role of some kind.  More specifically, areas favored for federal 
regulation include interstate CO2 transport, pipelines, liability, and all aspects of offshore CCS.  
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Areas favored for state regulation relate to property rights, including pore space ownership, 
mineral rights unitization, and eminent domain. 
With respect to shaping CCS liability policy, prior scholarship has considered a wide 
range of approaches (Carnegie Mellon, 2009; IOGCC, 2007), with no single liability framework 
emerging as the clear favorite (Carnegie Mellon, 2009; Flatt, 2009). Our results, however, 
suggest that the CCS community believes that eventual government custody of sequestered CO2 
is a necessary component of any liability regime.  Over 40% of survey participants who 
identified a specific liability limit in their open-answer responses favor this approach.  This 
position adds to the recommendations of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and 
Storage, which characterized government custody as only one of four possible approaches to 
managing long-term liability (DOE, 2010).  According to our survey results, the next most 
favored liability approaches would address pore space ownership, cap liability akin to that for 
nuclear power operators, limit statutory environmental liability, and clarify long-term site 
monitoring requirements. 
 The divergence of our findings and the extant scholarly literature make plain a number of 
further, potentially important lessons for shaping CCS policy.  Survey respondents ranked the 
lack of commercial-scale projects near the bottom of their list of concerns in CCS development.  
This stands in stark contrast to the scholarly literature, which long has suggested that large, 
commercial-scale projects must be completed in defined, sequential stages before CCS can truly 
get off the ground (Carnegie Mellon, 2009; GAO, 2008; Melzer, 2008).  Contrary to this view, 
our survey suggests that the CCS industry is confident that the technology can be made fully 
operational today.  This implies that calls for commercial-scale demonstration of CCS 
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technology may have more to do with investor confidence and social acceptance than 
engineering capacity and technological know-how. 
 Similarly, a number of prior studies have pointed to two potential barriers to CCS 
deployment that our survey results arguably discount: a lack of knowledge about CO2 reservoir 
geology and plume movement (IPCC, 2005; IRGC, 2008), and public discomfort with CCS 
(DOE, 2010; WRI, 2008).  These issues ranked quite low as possible CCS impediments in our 
survey.  Knowledge of reservoir geology and capacity scored thirty-third and thirty-fourth out of 
forty-one potential CCS barriers, and lack of adequate sequestration sites scored thirty-sixth.  
While lack of public acceptance of CCS came in higher, at fifteenth, this ranking may reflect 
other concerns about CCS, such as its anticipated impact on electricity prices.  Indeed, the mean 
obstacle values for the narrower categories of public resistance—to CCS storage facilities, 
transportation facilities, and capture technology—were much lower than the catchall public 
resistance score would imply: twenty-first, thirty-second, and thirty-ninth, respectively.  This 
may suggest that the CCS community is not worried about public opposition to CCS per se, but 
rather, is apprehensive about the public’s acceptance of regulatory costs.  As those most familiar 
with the technology and its impediments, the views of the CCS community may be telling on this 
issue.  Of course, it is also possible that the CCS community underestimates the level of public 
opposition to commercial-scale CCS deployment.  Especially given that public resistance has 
proven a significant obstacle to many different kinds of energy projects in the United States—
from off-shore wind farms to electricity transmission siting, from nuclear power plant relicensing 
to new coal facility permitting—public and interest group resistance to new CCS projects could 
prove significant, the CCS community’s views notwithstanding.  Indeed, regulation that accounts 
for public participation and involvement can lead to more robust, and lasting, success (Anshelm 
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and Galis, 2011; Davies, 1999).  Thus, while efforts may be needed to address both the geologic 
knowledge gaps and public resistance to CCS, insofar as the CCS community is concerned, these 
barriers should not be among the first targets for government action. 
 Finally, our survey results add detail to a picture on CCS financial incentives that the 
literature thus far has painted only in broad strokes.  Our results show that the CCS community 
most strongly supports four governmental incentives for CCS use: a carbon tax or price, liability 
limits, tax and other financial incentives, and a comprehensive CCS regulatory scheme.  These 
incentive rankings dovetail with the dominant views expressed in the CCS literature, namely, 
that the absence of a meaningful carbon price (Der, 2010; Melzer, 2008) and clear liability 
limitations (Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies Hearing, 2008; Chestney, 2009; DOE, 
2010; Flatt, 2009) stand as the most significant barriers to CCS.  While no single, clear ranking 
of preferences emerged from the data, survey responses also show that the CCS community 
favors tax incentives, such as production tax credits, over numerous other possibilities, such as 
technological mandates, CCS subsidies, and R&D funding. 
6.  Conclusion 
 However limited the progress on broadscale CCS commercialization has been to date, the 
path toward deployment within the United States is clear.  Comprehensive regulation and 
meaningful carbon pricing are essential if CCS is to move from promising prospect to 
commercial-scale implementation.  In the absence of government leadership, the private sector is 
unlikely to assume the significant economic costs inherent in adopting CCS.  On this score, our 
survey results lend greater detail to understanding the current barriers and incentives to domestic 
CCS deployment. 
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 Carbon pricing and CCS regulation represent the most likely policy drivers.  But in order 
to be effective, regulation must also address liability.  The potential long-term liability associated 
with CCS creates uncertainty that most stakeholders believe necessitates federal legislation, with 
CCS stakeholders preferring either post-closure federal assumption of ownership, liability caps, 
or pooled risk similar to that undertaken for the civil nuclear power industry.  CCS stakeholders 
also favor a regulatory framework under which the federal government sets nationwide standards 
but, similar to other federal environmental programs, allows states to assume primacy in 
administering the federal framework in a manner mindful of local conditions. 
 The more robust the framework for CCS utilization, the greater the likelihood that CCS 
can advance to the stage of being a meaningful policy tool.  Hopefully, the granularity provided 
by our survey can help inform future proposals for the kind of CCS regulation that is needed to 
advance this important climate change mitigation strategy. 
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1
 Our survey used the terms carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) and geologic carbon 
sequestration (GCS).  The latter refers specifically to the land-based sequestration phase of CCS 
operations, while CCS sometimes refers more broadly to capture, transport, injection, and 
permanent sequestration in land- or non-land-based storage.  To minimize confusion, this article 
uses CCS and GCS interchangeably.  
2
 A copy of the survey is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.04.033.  
3
 Two of the forty-one potential barriers were not coded into one of the seven general categories.  
Those were “public resistance to new coal-fired power plants,” which received a mean score of 
3.46, and “inadequate pipeline capacity for CO2 transportation,” which received a mean score of 
2.81.  These barriers were excluded because they are only indirectly related to CCS or did not 
align closely with the broader categories.  
 43 
                                                                                                                                                             
4
 Survey recipients were asked to rank 41 different possible barriers to CCS commercialization 
on a 1-to-5, with 1 representing “no obstacle” to CCS commercialization, 2 representing “minor” 
obstacles, 3 “measurable” obstacles, 4 “significant” obstacles, and 5 “critical” obstacles.  A mean 
score of 3.5 or higher but less than 4.5 is thus considered “significant,” because it represents the 
range at which the barrier ranking calculation rounds up from “measurable” to “significant” and, 
likewise, does not round up from “significant” to “critical.” 
5
 Percentages of responses to open-ended questions were calculated after blank, “don’t know,” 
and “other” responses (those that fit no coded category) were excluded.  The number of “other” 
responses was minor.  Where a response identified more than one obstacle, all obstacles were 
coded. 
6
 The mean responses to the 41 specific barriers ranged from a low of 1.97 (technology to 
transport CO2) to a high of 4.32 (the cost of CCS).  Responses to the 41 barrier questions 
generated 7,510 individual data points, yielding a mean value of 3.35.  The “Mean ‘Catchall’ 
Obstacle Score” and “Mean Aggregated Category-Wide Score” were tested for significant 
departure from the overall mean value of 3.35. 
7
 Daily involvement with CCS technology was tested against occasional involvement with CCS 
technology, and daily involvement with CCS law and policy was tested against occasional 
involvement with CCS law and policy.  Involvement with technology was not tested against 
involvement with law and policy. 
8
 In many U.S. jurisdictions, state public utility commissions (PUCs) or public service 
commissions (PSCs) approve retail electricity rates.  They do so to ensure that prices are neither 
too high (limiting impacts on customers), nor too low (ensuring utilities’ ability to attract capital).  
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PUCs and PSCs also typically review utilities’ investments to ensure they are prudent.  By 
contrast, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has jurisdiction over wholesale 
power sales. 
9
 Prior research has identified a correlation between knowledge of a technology and favorable 
attitudes toward its deployment, both for CCS specifically and analogous industrial activities 
(Evar, 2011; Sala and Oltra, 2011; van Alphen, 2007).  Several authors, however, have cautioned 
against overreliance on expert assessments, noting that experts may downplay concerns in the 
abstract (Evar, 2009) or underestimate public resistance (Bradbury et al., 2009). 
10
 Self-identified non-profit representatives made up only 8% of survey respondents.  While this 
group of respondents preferred “other” as the best way for government to incentivize CCS use, 
only three respondents specified what “other” meant.  The remainder did not define this “other” 
governmental incentive. 
